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The Optimal Scope of Physicians’ Duty to 
Protect Patients’ Privacy  
Ronen Avraham† &  
Joachim Meyer†† 
On March 24, 2015, French air traffic control lost radio 
contact with Germanwings Flight 9525 shortly after the air-
craft reached a height of about 6,000 feet.1 Andreas Lubitz, the 
co-pilot of the aircraft, had locked himself in the cockpit and 
was leading the aircraft on a fatal descent from its cruising al-
titude of 38,000 feet.2 The pilot, who left Lubitz alone in the 
cockpit while taking a bathroom break, attempted to hack 
through the locked cockpit door with an axe while futilely 
screaming at Lubitz to open the door.3 Flight 9525 crashed in a 
remote area in the French Alps, killing all 150 people on board.4 
Post-crash investigations revealed that Lubitz had been treated 
for severe depression and suicidal tendencies, and that Lubitz 
even took a break from the Lufthansa flight school to treat a 
serious depressive episode.5 In fact, Lubitz consulted forty-one 
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 1. Krishnadev Calamur, As Night Falls, Officials Call off Search Opera-
tion for German Plane, NPR (Mar. 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/24/395011737/germanwings-a320-crashes-in 
-french-alps. 
 2. Dan Bilefsky & Nicola Clark, Fatal Descent of Germanwings Plane 
Was ‘Deliberate,’ French Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/europe/germanwings-crash.html.  
 3. Raphaelle Logerot & Kate Millar, The Germanwings Pilot Left for the 
Bathroom and Came Back Shouting ‘Open the D--- Door’, BUS. INSIDER  
(Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-alps-crash-captain 
-shouted-open-the-damn-door-2015-3.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Associated Press, Germanwings Flight 4U9525: Flight School Knew of 
Depressive Episode, CBC (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ 
germanwings-flight-4u9525-flight-school-knew-of-depressive-episode-1 
.3015984. Lufthansa, Germanwings’ parent company, knew of the serious de-
pressive episode as Lubitz informed Lufthansa of the incident and that it had 
subsided in an email. Id. Lufthansa cleared Lubitz to fly after Lubitz passed 
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doctors over a five-year period, and visited doctors seven times 
in the month leading up to the crash.6 Investigators even found 
a torn-up sick note Lubitz received from a doctor that would 
have kept him off work the day of the crash.7 However this in-
formation was not disclosed to Lufthansa because of strict 
German medical confidentiality rules.8  
Although the investigation into Flight 9525 continues, it is 
clear that third parties had evidence of Lubitz’s battle with de-
pression before Lubitz deliberately crashed the aircraft. Still, 
there remains the pressing question of who should have been 
warned about Lubitz’s sensitive medical details. Certainly a 
warning about Lubitz’s suicidal tendencies would have been 
useful to the pilot who left Lubitz alone in the cockpit, or to the 
rest of Flight 9525’s flight crew. Should the families of Flight 
9525’s passengers win a lawsuit against Lubitz’s doctors for not 
disclosing his medical history to the airline? Revealing a pilot’s 
medical history under any disclosure policy could impose the 
unintended effect of disincentivizing the pilot’s desire to seek 
treatment in the first place. A policy that would levy an out-
right ban on pilots who had any history of mental illness would 
invite a similar chilling effect. What the story of Germanwings 
Flight 9525 confirms is that the proper theoretical balance be-
tween patient privacy and third party safety can have disas-
trous, real-world implications.9 
When discussing the optimal scope of the duty to protect 
patients’ privacy, the literature compares two incommensura-
 
all his medical checks. Id.  
 6. William Horobin & Stacy Meichtry, Germanwings Crash Probe Wid-
ens Beyond Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2015), http://www 
.wsj.com/articles/germanwings-co-pilot-andreas-lubitz-feared-losing-vision 
-prosecutor-1434043118.  
 7. Associated Press, supra note 5.  
 8. Richard Weiss et al., Medical Privacy Rules Let Germanwings Co-Pilot 
Conceal Illness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-03-29/medical-privacy-rules-let-germanwings-co-pilot-conceal 
-illness.  
 9. An investigatory task force impaneled by European Commissioner for 
Transport Violeta Bulc has recommended looser medical privacy protections 
for all commercial aviators in response to the Germanwings crash. Robert 
Wall & Andy Pasztor, Germanwings Task Force Urges Enhanced Screening of 
Pilots, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanwings 
-task-force-wants-ehanced-screening-of-pilots-1437127381. German Medical 
and aviation associations have previously rejected calls to relax existing confi-
dentially rules. Caroline Copley, Germanwings Crash Triggers Debate on Con-
fidentiality Taboo, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-france-crash-germany-confidentiality-idUSKBN0MR2CT20150331.  
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ble interests: privacy and safety. Policymakers face a difficult 
task when trying to find an optimal solution, balancing these 
two, often conflicting, interests. For example, a major goal of 
the federal health privacy standards under the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)10 was to en-
sure that health information is properly protected while allow-
ing the use of such information to promote high-quality health 
research and care.11 Critics point out that the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule is unsuccessful in reaching this benchmark: the Rule cre-
ates barriers to research which result in biased research sam-
ples while simultaneously failing to incorporate comprehensive 
patient privacy protections.12 Thus HIPPA rules, though seek-
ing an optimal balance between privacy and safety interests, 
fall short on both fronts. Similar privacy and safety trade-off 
debates arise in topics as diverse as the increased use of bio-
metric surveillance technologies,13 to software system design,14 
and to government data collection practices.15 As long as our so-
ciety continues to value both interests, the debate is sure to at-
tach itself to shifting technological, social, and political norms.  
In this Article, we confront the trade-off between patient 
confidentiality and public safety as manifested in the legal duty 
to warn or report potentially harmful patient behavior. The in-
commensurability problem seems to plague the analysis of the 
 
 10. “The HIPPA Privacy Rule set[s] forth detailed regulations regarding 
the types of uses and disclosures of individuals’ personally identifiable health 
information” by health plans, healthcare providers, and health care clearing-
houses. INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRI-
VACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 1–2 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 
2009), http://www.nap.edu/read/12458/chapter/2.  
 11. Id.  
 12. See id.  
 13. See generally Kevin W. Bowyer, Face Recognition Technology: Security 
Versus Privacy, IEEE TECH. & SOC'Y MAG., Spring 2004, at 15–16 (discussing 
the privacy and safety concerns involved in the use of facial recognition soft-
ware in public areas). 
 14. See generally Golnaz Elahi & Eric Yu, Modeling and Analysis of Secu-
rity Trade-Offs–a Goal Oriented Approach, 68 DATA & KNOWLEDGE ENGINEER-
ING 579 (2009) (discussing the trade-off between user anonymity and user au-
thentication and auditability in software system design). 
 15.  E.g., John McLaughlin, NSA Intelligence-Gathering Programs Keep 
Us Safe, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
nsa-intelligence-gathering-programs-keep-us-safe/2014/01/02/0fd51b22-7173 
-11e3-8b3f-b1666705ca3b_story.html. The former acting CIA Director and 30-
year veteran of the agency argues that information collected by the National 
Security Administration (NSA) does no more to affect privacy than infor-
mation gathered by private companies, yet serves as a key tool in the counter-
terrorism arsenal. Id.  
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two interests: what comparable rudiment do privacy and public 
safety share in the duty to warn or report context? We develop 
a model which solves this problem by finding the optimal bal-
ance between protecting patients’ privacy (as a means to en-
courage patients to seek treatment, thus reducing risk in socie-
ty) and warning third parties or the state (again, as a means to 
reduce risk in society).  
Patients seeking effective medical treatment often depend 
on privacy. Without it, patients may prefer to avoid treatment, 
and their untreated condition may pose greater safety risks 
than the same condition when treated. Thus privacy and safety 
are not complementary, and increasing one will necessarily 
lower the other. However, there may be more complex relations 
between the two, where limiting privacy may also impair safe-
ty. Since we compare safety-safety rather than privacy-safety, 
we can hone in on an optimal balance of both the privacy and 
safety interest through an intuitive, objective, and applicable 
quantitative framework rather than just balancing the two in-
terests to reach an arbitrary equilibrium. The safety-safety 
formulation thus avoids the difficulties inherent in the apples-
to-oranges privacy-safety comparison.16  
Our model shows that imposing an unqualified duty to re-
port or warn might result in an increase in the dangerousness 
of the primary behavior society is concerned about, such as pi-
loting, driving, or violent acts. Developing a formula not much 
more complicated than the Hand formula,17 we show how the 
chilling effect and the effectiveness of the medical treatment 
should be factors that courts consider when imposing a duty on 
medical professionals to report their patients to the state or en-
forcing a duty to warn third parties.18  
 
 16. See NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., SECURITY, AT WHAT COST? QUANTIFYING 
PEOPLE’S TRADE-OFFS ACROSS LIBERTY, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY 1–14 (2010), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_ 
TR664.pdf (commenting on the difficulty of designing frameworks which allow 
scholars to quantify the extent which people may be willing to give up the 
right to privacy for greater safety). 
 17. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947).  
 18. At a more general level, the model we propose here differs somewhat 
from most models developed in the context of law and economics. Most eco-
nomic models adopt game theoretical approaches, computing equilibrium pre-
dictions for different legal settings. The approach we take resembles an engi-
neering model. The idea is not to come up with exact predictions about 
individual actors’ actions, but rather to specify the minimal conditions at 
which a solution will achieve the desired outcomes. Whether these conditions 
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Consider the following scenarios: In scenario (1), an epilep-
tic individual has a seizure while driving, causing an accident 
and injuring another motorist. The injured motorist brings a 
tort action against the epileptic individual’s doctor for negli-
gently treating his epileptic patient, for example, by failing to 
warn him to not drive. The court holds that the doctor could po-
tentially be held liable to the motorist (a third party). In sce-
nario (2), a male patient of a university clinic reveals his inten-
tion to kill a specific woman to one of the university’s 
psychologists. The psychologist warns the university police, but 
does not warn the woman. The patient, feeling betrayed by the 
psychologist, does not go back to therapy, and later kills the 
woman. The woman’s parents bring a suit against the psy-
chologist, and the court holds that the psychologist could be 
held liable for not warning the woman even though he was not 
negligent towards his patient. In scenario (3), a state statute 
imposes a duty on doctors to report pilots that have dangerous 
diseases such as heart diseases or severe depression.  
Do these three scenarios have anything in common? Sce-
narios (1) and (2) deal with the problem known in tort law as 
“duty of care towards third parties.” Scenario (1) deals with the 
question of whether a doctor should be held liable towards uni-
dentified third parties who are victims of a dangerous patient 
when the doctor was only negligent towards his own patient. 
That was the question in the famous case of Duvall.19 Scenario 
(2) deals with the duty towards identified third parties (victims 
of the doctor’s patient) when the doctor was not negligent to-
wards his dangerous patient. That was the question in the fa-
mous case of Tarasoff.20 Scenario (3) deals with the statutory 
requirement to report certain dangerous patients, such as 
Lubitz, to the state.  
Despite the doctrinal differences, all three cases deal with 
a similar theoretical problem. Indeed, all three challenge us to 
think about the optimal scope of a medical provider’s duty to 
 
will be met or not will depend on a variety of factors, including the economic 
incentives of the different actors, the alternatives open for them, etc. Decision 
makers who have to decide on the implementation of certain legal policies can 
take these specifications of minimal conditions into account when considering 
whether the actions are likely to lead to the desired outcomes. 
 19. See Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 276, 279 (1984) (addressing the 
doctor’s potential negligence in failing to properly treat his patient for his epi-
leptic seizures and failing to warn him not to drive).  
 20. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340, 342–51 
(Cal. 1976). 
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protect their patients’ privacy on the one hand, and their con-
flicting duty to report their dangerous patients to third party 
victims (whether identified like in Tarasoff, or unidentified like 
in Duvall) or to the state on the other hand.  
The goal of this paper is to conceptualize the major rele-
vant considerations for defining the optimal scope of the duty to 
protect patients’ privacy in light of the conflicting duties to 
warn third parties or to report dangerous patients to the state.  
Conventional wisdom held by courts and scholars alike al-
lows doctors to violate their patients’ confidentiality and im-
poses a duty towards third parties based primarily on the no-
tion of foreseeability, or reasonable anticipation that harm or 
injury is a likely result of the patient’s words or acts. The more 
likely the harm is to occur, the more physicians are expected to 
break confidentiality, especially if the victim is identifiable. 
However, as we show in this paper, there are three other criti-
cal considerations to which many courts and legal commenta-
tors have not given enough thought. The first consideration is 
the chilling effect such a duty will have on patients’ incentives 
to seek treatment from physicians and psychiatrists. Second, 
and importantly, is the effect that the lack of medical treat-
ment will have on the riskiness of the primary behavior of con-
cern (e.g. driving, killing, and flying). Third, and relatedly, is 
the effectiveness of the medical treatment in improving the pa-
tient’s condition and its impact on the primary behavior of con-
cern. 
We present a model that delivers a very simple yet over-
looked intuition: the optimal scope of the duty to warn third 
parties, or to report certain patients to the state, should take 
into account not only (1) the probability of harm to others by 
the patient, but also (2) the likely success of treatment by doc-
tors and the treatment’s impact on the behavior of concern, as 
well as (3) the chilling effect such a duty will have on patients 
seeking help, and (4) the impact of that effect on the primary 
behavior of concern. We show that, holding all else equal, the 
more effective the therapy or treatment is in reducing patients’ 
riskiness, relative to their riskiness without treatment, and the 
larger the chilling effect is, the less society should impose a du-
ty to report or warn. Somewhat counterintuitively, even if the 
treatment is only partially successful in reducing patients’ risk-
iness and still leaves the patients in a psychologically danger-
ous or physically unhealthy state, it may still be better not to 
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impose a duty to warn on physicians if the chilling effect is too 
great.21  
Our model has important implications both for torts and 
reporting statutes. With respect to tort law, our model provides 
courts and legal commentators with a simple formula—not 
much more complicated than the Hand formula—on how to 
think about the optimal duty owed by physicians. What is now 
done in a somewhat arbitrary and erratic way, we propose to 
formalize and structure. The major insight is that the optimal 
scope is context dependent and might therefore change over 
time with advances in medicine. For example, because the cur-
rent effectiveness of treating dementia is very limited, while 
the increase in the risk for accident involvement is substantial 
(between two- to eight-fold greater for elderly drivers with mild 
to moderate dementia versus those not demented),22 it makes 
sense to impose a duty to warn or report on health providers. 
By contrast, for seizure disorders, such as epilepsy, the treat-
ment is very effective. The risk of accidents involving emergen-
cy department visits when the person adheres to the prescribed 
anti-epileptic drug treatment is reduced by one-half.23 In that 
situation, to promote road safety, it might well be better to not 
impose a duty on the provider.  
Moreover, the duty to report or warn might depend on the 
stage of the disease, the probability of its cure, and its impact 
on the primary behavior’s risks. Thus, doctors might not have a 
duty to report or warn third parties when they treat patients 
that are in the early stages of HIV, because then the disease is 
arguably more treatable, and it is beneficial from a social wel-
fare perspective to not chill patients from seeking help. By con-
trast, the duty might well be imposed in later stages because 
the chilling effect from reporting during those stages is not as 
troubling.  
One corollary from the model is that the more uncertainty 
 
 21. Not taking into account the costs of reporting or warning in terms of 
their impact on the primary behavior of concern and only focusing on the 
probability of harm is conceptually similar to the mistake scholars and courts 
made before acknowledging the costs (B) component in Learned Hand’s fa-
mous BPL negligence formula.  
 22. Laura B. Brown & Brian R. Ott, Driving and Dementia: A Review of 
the Literature, J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY, 232, 232 (2004).  
 23. E. Faught et al., Nonadherence to Antiepileptic Drugs and Increased 
Mortality: Findings from the RANSOM Study, 71 NEUROLOGY 1572, 1575 
(2008) (finding that nonadherence to antiepileptic drugs was associated with a 
50% higher incidence of emergency department visits versus adherent behav-
ior).  
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surrounds the success of the therapy, as is, for example, usually 
the case in psychotherapy, the more favorable it becomes for 
medical providers to not be required to report, but instead be 
afforded discretion as to whether or not to report their patients 
to the state. The reasoning is that providers might well be in 
the best position to weigh both the costs and the benefits of re-
porting in terms of its impact on the primary behavior of con-
cern. This insight has significant implications for the debate 
about the liability of physicians in Lubitz’s case and in other 
important instances such as not reporting child abuse.  
Our paper is divided into five parts. Part I details the duty 
imposed on doctors to warn or protect both identified and uni-
dentified third parties derived from tort law. Part II discusses a 
physician’s duty to report patients who are HIV positive. Part 
III outlines the state-imposed duty to report individuals with 
certain serious, driving-impairing conditions (usually through 
reporting statutes) on physicians. Part IV reviewes empirical 
evidence on how consequences for reporting can have chilling 
effects on reporting in the first place. Part IV presents a model 
for determining the optimal scope of the duty to warn or report. 
Part V concludes.  
  TORT LAW: THE DUTY TO WARN OR PROTECT THIRD 
PARTIES FROM “DANGEROUS” PATIENTS   
The Restatement (Third) of Torts states that “[a]n actor in 
a special relationship with another owes a duty of reasonable 
care to third parties with regard to risks posed by the other 
that arise within the scope of the relationship.”24 One such spe-
cial relationship that gives rise to this duty is that of “a mental-
health professional with patients.”25 After the seminal Tarasoff 
decision, the Restatement (Third)26 recognized and adopted the 
duty imposed on doctors.  
 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 41(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 2012).  
 25. Id. § 41(b)(4). 
 26. The Restatement (Third) outlines the history of the duty to warn an-
nounced in the Restatement (Second):  
Section 315 of the Second Restatement of Torts stated the general 
proposition that there is no affirmative duty to control the conduct of 
a third party so as to prevent the third party from causing harm to 
another. Subsection (a) provided an exception to that general rule 
based on a special relationship between the actor and the third party. 
Subsequent Sections elaborated on the relationships that were suffi-
cient to impose such a duty [§§ 316, 317, 319] . . . [t]his Section re-
places [these sections] and includes an additional relationship [for 
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Tarasoff was a case in which a patient of a hospital killed a 
woman he was infatuated with after confiding his intention to 
kill her to one of the hospital’s psychologists.27 Although the 
doctor in Tarasoff informed the police of his patient’s inten-
tions, the police did not detain him. The doctor, however, did 
not warn the victim or any member of her family. Feeling be-
trayed by the psychologist, the patient did not go back to thera-
py and later killed the woman. The victim’s parents alleged 
that her death was proximately caused by the psychologist’s 
negligence in failing to warn the victim or others. The court 
held that therapists owe identified third parties a duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect them from serious violent dan-
ger when the therapist determines, or pursuant to relevant pro-
fessional standards should have determined, that the 
therapist’s patient poses a serious risk of harm to said third 
party of such danger. That duty is usually fulfilled by warning 
the third party about this risk (“duty to warn”).28  
Justice Clark dissented and recognized the crucial policy 
considerations that weigh against imposing a duty on psycholo-
gists and other mental health professionals in such situations.29 
Clark warned that such a duty “[w]hile offering virtually no 
benefit to society . . . will frustrate psychiatric treatment, in-
vade fundamental patient rights and increase violence.”30 
Clark’s dissent lamented the effect such a duty would have on 
the doctor-patient relationship and the patient’s willingness to 
seek treatment, stating that “without substantial assurance of 
confidentiality, those requiring treatment will be deterred from 
seeking assistance.”31 Alas, only a few other commentators and 
 
mental-health professional and patient].  
Id. at cmt. a.  
 27. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339 (Cal. 1976). 
See Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril Begins”: 25 
Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 192–96 (2000) for a detailed de-
scription of the facts of the case.  
 28. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340, 350–51 (“The discharge of this duty may 
require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the 
nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or 
others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take 
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.”).  
 29. Id. at 355, 358 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
 30. Id. at 358 (“Overwhelming policy considerations weigh against impos-
ing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against harm.”).  
 31. Id. at 359. 
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scholars have also discussed the possible negative effects such a 
duty would have on effective mental health treatment.32 
Following Tarasoff, twenty-nine states now require mental 
health professionals to warn or protect potential victims about 
credible threats from their patients.33 Sixteen states and D.C. 
make the duty to protect or warn discretionary (these states 
“allow” mental health care professionals to disclose potential 
danger to third parties).34 Four states do not impose any duty to 
protect or warn on mental health care professionals.35 
Some courts also began to expand Tarasoff’s holding in dif-
ferent ways.36 One of the broadest interpretations was an-
nounced in the case of Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a case in 
which people in a crowded nightclub were attacked with a 
shotgun by a psychiatric patient without any advance warn-
ing.37 The patient was receiving psychiatric treatment from the 
hospital and purchased a gun while he was still receiving 
treatment.38 Shortly after purchasing the gun, the patient re-
moved himself from treatment against the advice of his doctors 
and shot into the crowded nightclub killing a man and injuring 
his wife.39 The court in Lipari allowed the plaintiffs to proceed 
in their case against the patient’s hospital, thereby rejecting 
the Tarasoff limitation of only having a duty towards identifia-
ble victims.40 The court seemed to impose a duty on therapists 
to predict dangerousness, and in addition a duty to protect so-
ciety from “dangerous” patients.  
The court in Duvall (mentioned above) similarly extended 
Tarasoff to include a duty to protect the general public (not just 
 
 32. See, e.g., Buckner & Firestone, supra note 27, at 200–13 (discussing 
the various scholars and some courts that criticized the duty imposed on doc-
tors and how the scope of such duty has been greatly expanded to include not 
only mental health care professionals but other doctors as well).  
 33.  Mental Health Professionals’ Duty To Warn, NAT. CONFERENCE ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental 
-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. See Buckner & Firestone, supra note 27, at 200 (listing the broadest 
court cases and noting that “[t]he duty to protect, which was enunciated in the 
Tarasoff case, was interpreted more broadly by several courts that purported 
to follow Tarasoff, so that the duty to protect was not uniform throughout the 
United States”).  
 37. See id.  
 38. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Neb. 1980).  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 191.  
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specifically identified potential victims) from potentially “dan-
gerous” patients.41 Duvall went even further than Lipari in two 
ways. First, it imposed a duty on mental health care profes-
sionals to recognize other general medical conditions such as 
epilepsy (not just dangerous propensities of their patients 
based on psychiatric problems) and to protect the public from 
such individuals.42 Second, it imposed a duty on mental health 
care professionals towards unidentified third parties who were 
victims of the patient’s negligent (or even faultless) behavior 
and not just of the patient’s criminal behavior. However, while 
some courts have extended Tarasoff, others have limited its 
reach.43  
  THE SPECIAL CASE OF HIV   
Patients diagnosed with either AIDS or HIV raise interest-
ing dilemmas regarding both the duty to warn third parties and 
the duty to report to the state. As will be explained shortly, the 
 
 41. Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 278–79 (1984). 
 42. See id. (imposing a duty on the psychiatrist to “treat” his patient’s epi-
lepsy). The court’s position seems to be contrary to the position paper issued 
by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1993, in which the APA ad-
dressed the “role of psychiatrists in assessing driving ability.” Kristen Snyder 
& Joseph D. Bloom, Physician Reporting of Impaired Drivers: A New Trend in 
State Law?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 76, 78 (2004) (discussing Posi-
tion Statement on the Role of Psychiatrists in Assessing Driving Ability, 152 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 819, 819 (1995) [hereinafter “Position Statement”]). In this 
position paper, the APA asserted that although psychiatric patients “may ex-
perience symptoms that can interfere with their ability to operate a motor ve-
hicle safely . . . . psychiatrists have no special expertise in assessing the ability 
of their patients to drive . . . . [and] should not be expected to make such as-
sessments in the course of clinical practice.” Position Statement, supra.  
 43. See, for example, Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 626–
30 (1999), in which the court held that an ophthalmologist did not have a duty 
to another motorist that was killed in an accident involving his patient. The 
court stated that the appellant’s decedent was simply not a foreseeable victim 
that the court would recognize. Id. at 630. The court added that it would re-
fuse to stretch foreseeability beyond the point of recognition as doing so would 
make liability endless. Id. The court warned that to allow liability in the case 
make physicians absolutely liable for the vicarious acts of their patients. Id.; 
see also Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751 
F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984) (restricting a therapist’s duty to the “specific threats 
to specific persons” rule); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (D. 
Md. 1982) (limiting the duty to protect third parties to only instances where 
the therapist had the right to commit his patient); Estate of Votteler v. 
Heltsley, 327 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1982) (determining that the Tarasoff rul-
ing supports the conclusion that a duty should not be imposed when the fore-
seeable victim is already aware of the danger). See generally Buckner & Fire-
stone, supra note 27, at 200–13 for a full discussion of various examples in 
which courts have both expanded and limited Tarasoff. 
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special interest stems from the fact that AIDS is a disease that 
advances in stages, and the efficacy of treatment declines sig-
nificantly in each consecutive stage.44  
All fifty states require physicians to report patients that 
have been diagnosed with either AIDS or HIV to local or state 
health departments.45 While states previously differed in the 
requirements for HIV reporting (some requiring name-based46 
reporting, some requiring only code-based47 reporting),48 all 
 
 44. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 17 HIV SURVEIL-
LANCE REPORT NO. 3, PT. A, at 9–10 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/  
statistics_2010_HIV_Surveillance_Report_vol_17_no_3.pdf. “The advent in 
1996 of potent combination antiretroviral therapy (ART), sometimes called 
HAART (highly active antiretroviral therapy) or cART (effective combination 
antiretroviral therapy), changed the course of the HIV epidemic.” CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE PREVEN-
TION BENEFITS OF HIV TREATMENT 1 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/  
prevention/research/tap/. “These ‘cocktails’ of three or more antiretroviral 
drugs used in combination gave patients and scientists new hope for fighting 
the epidemic and have significantly improved life expectancy—to decades ra-
ther than months.” Id. Previously, no one had conducted a randomized clinical 
trial to show that that treating HIV-infected persons also significantly reduced 
their risk of transmitting the infection to sexual and drug-using partners who 
didn’t have the virus. Id.  
That changed in 2011 with the publication of findings from the HIV 
Prevention Trials Network (HPTN) 052 study, a randomized clinical 
trial designed in part to evaluate whether the early initiation of ART 
can prevent the sexual transmission of HIV among heterosexual cou-
ples in which one partner is HIV-infected and the other is not. This 
landmark study validated that early HIV treatment has a profound 
prevention benefit: results showed that the risk of transmitting HIV 
to an uninfected partner was reduced by 96%.  
Id.  
 45. Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, HIV and Health Law: Striking the Bal-
ance Between Legal Mandates and Medical Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 
(Oct., 2005), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2005/10/hlaw1-0510.html.  
 46. “Name-based reporting” requires the physician to report the actual 
name of the HIVP patient. See id.  
 47. “Code-based reporting” simply assigns a certain code to each HIVP 
patient instead of using their actual name. See id. 
 48. See id. (describing the pre-Ryan White CARE Act 2006 amendment 
status of HIV state reporting systems in which “forty-three state . . . health 
departments . . . implemented confidential name-based HIV reporting, while 
approximately 14 other state and local health departments use[d] code-based 
or name-to-code reporting methods”). The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS 
Resources Emergency (CARE) Act provided states funding for individuals af-
fected by AIDS/HIV. See Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emer-
gency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq. (2012)), https://www 
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-104/pdf/STATUTE-104-Pg576.pdf. The Act was 
amended in 2006, changing the manner in which states were designated for 
federal funding; giving states that did not have a name-based system of HIV 
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states have now moved to a name-based reporting system.49 No 
state takes the stage of the HIV into account in their reporting 
requirements: all states require reporting HIV at any stage 
when it is detected.50 Despite the trend towards name-based re-
porting, the arguments against such reporting did not escape 
some states’ eyes. States that were opposed to name-based re-
porting systems, such as California, did not want to impose 
name-based reporting because the states “were concerned that 
reporting names might discourage people from testing, particu-
larly the people at highest risk for HIV infection.”51 Other 
states “feared that reporting names would deter treatment, 
since reporting also occurs when clients access medical care.”52 
As the American Medical Association (AMA) notes: 
Public policy encourages high-risk groups to submit to 
HIV testing because those individuals who know they 
are HIV positive are more likely to seek treatment 
and take precautions that may prevent transmission 
of the virus. However, if HIV-related information is 
readily disclosed by health care providers, individuals 
may become more reluctant to seek testing.53  
While one study conducted in New York seems to indicate 
that HIV name-based reporting does not affect patients’ deci-
sions to seek treatment, there is little research in this area, and 
the effects on patients of reporting at different stages of HIV 
have not been well documented or studied thus far.54 
 
status reporting a substantially less amount of federal funding. See Ryan 
White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–415, 
120 Stat. 2767 (2006) (codified in scattered scetions of 42 U.S.C. § 300  
et seq. (2012)), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ415/pdf/PLAW 
-109publ415.pdf. 
 49. See State HIV Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). There 
are twenty-five states that also have “HIV-specific criminal laws.” See HIV-
Specific Criminal Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www .cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/exposure.html (last visited Jan. 12, 
2016). 
 50. See State HIV Laws, supra note 49.  
 51. HIV NAME-BASED REPORTING, 15 HIV COUNSELOR PERSPECTIVES NO. 
3, at 1, 1 (2006), http://ahppublications.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/persp1006 
.pdf. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Lin & Liang, supra note 45.  
 54. See James M. Tesoriero et al., The Effect of Name-Based Reporting 
and Partner Notification on HIV Testing in New York State, 98 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 728 (2008) (finding that “[h]igh risk individuals had limited aware-
ness of the reporting and notification law, and few cited concern about named 
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With respect to the tort duty to warn, several states have 
declined to impose Tarasoff’s “duty to warn” on physicians in 
HIV-patient cases. For example, Iowa has adopted a statute 
explicitly stating that, “[t]his subsection shall not be interpreted 
to create a duty to warn third parties of the danger of exposure 
to HIV through contact with a person who tests positive for 
HIV infection.”55 Additionally, both Alabama and Arizona have 
statutes that shield doctors from liability both if they do and do 
not disclose an HIV-positive patient’s status to their partners.56 
One arguable exception is Reisner v. Regents of University 
of California, an HIV-patient case, in which the California 
Court of Appeals purported to extend Tarasoff’s holding to a 
case involving HIV disclosure.57 In Reisner, the plaintiff sued 
his girlfriend’s physician for negligence because the physician 
did not inform the patient that the blood used in a transfusion 
conducted on his girlfriend five years before was contaminated 
with HIV when the physician found out (a day after the sur-
gery).58 The plaintiff, who was intimate with the patient about 
three years after the surgery, contracted HIV.59 The plaintiff 
claimed that the physician owed him a duty to warn his girl-
friend, the physician’s patient, that the blood had HIV.60 How-
ever, this situation is different from Tarasoff and in fact quite 
similar to Duvall. While in Tarasoff, the Court held that the 
physician owed a third party a duty to warn the third party 
herself about his patient’s dangerous propensities, even though 
the physician was not negligent towards the patient, in Reisner 
(and Duvall) the court held that the physician owed a third 
party a duty to warn the physician’s own patient about his pa-
 
reporting as a reason for avoiding or delaying HIV testing. HIV testing levels  
. . . among those who tested HIV positive were not affected by the law”).  
 55. IOWA CODE § 141A.5(2)(c)(2) (2015) (emphasis added).  
 56. The Arizona statute states: “This section does not impose a duty to 
disclose information. A doctor of medicine is not civilly or criminally liable for 
either disclosing or not disclosing information.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1457(A) 
(2015). The Alabama statute states “No physician . . . shall incur any civil or 
criminal liability for revealing or failing to reveal confidential information 
within the approved rules.” ALA. CODE § 22-11A-38(f) (2015). 
 57. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“Tarasoff dictates the 
result in our case by holding that the doctors duty includes duty to warn ‘oth-
ers likely to apprise the victim of the danger . . . or take whatever . . . steps are 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.’”).  
 58. Id. at 519. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 520. 
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tient’s dangerous condition. Other cases, similar to Reisner, 
have held the same.61 
Indeed, there have not been any cases—known to us—
where a court has imposed liability on a physician for failing to 
warn a third party whom he knows may have been exposed to 
HIV by his patient if the patient himself has already been noti-
fied.62 This interpretation of the Tarasoff duty is unique to HIV 
 
 61. Id.; see also Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133, 138 
(Tenn. 2001) (“The duty contemplated here is not one to warn [the affected 
third party] himself of [the patient’s] exposure to HIV but to warn [the pa-
tient] so that she might take adequate precautions to prevent transmission of 
the disease to [a third party] and their child.”); C.W. v. Cooper Health System, 
906 A.2d 440, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“The question is not 
whether defendants have a duty to notify [the affected party] directly of [the 
patient’s] HIV test results. The duty of care to a third party . . . requires the 
health care provider to take all reasonable measures to notify the patient of 
the results of his HIV test . . . . Thus, the harm to [the affected party] flows 
from [the patient’s] ignorance of his own health status, not from [the hospi-
tal’s] failure to notify [the affected party] of [the patient’s] medical condition.”).  
 62. See Lin & Liang, supra note 45 (“[T]o date, attempts to create a duty 
for physicians to protect endangered third parties in HIV cases have been un-
successful”); Thomas Bradley et al., Legal Issues Associated with Disclosure of 
Patient’s HIV-Positive Status to Third Parties, THE BODY, http://www.thebody 
.com/content/art33211.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (similarly noting that 
“[i]n addition to statutory regulation on this issue, providers should be aware 
that there may be a common law legal duty imposed on them to protect third 
parties when their patients refuse to notify their contacts of their HIV-positive 
status. Currently, no such duty has been firmly established by law.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Santa Rosa Health Care Corp. v. Garcia, 964 S.W.2d 940, 944 
(Tex. 1998) (“[The hospital] had no statutory or common-law duty to notify 
[the patient’s wife] that she was at risk of contracting the HIV virus from [the 
patient].”); Lemon v. Stewart, 682 A.2d 1177, 1181 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) 
(“None of the cases that we cited for that proposition involved a duty to inform 
a third person that the patient was HIV-positive or had AIDS . . . . No case has 
been cited to us imposing a common law duty on the part of a health care pro-
vider to inform persons other than the provider’s patient of the patient’s posi-
tive HIV status, and we have found none.”). Note also N.O.L. v. District of Co-
lumbia, 674 A.2d 498 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), a case in which a husband brought 
suit against D.C. for failing to notify him that his wife tested positive for HIV. 
The court held that “the District (i.e., its employees at Saint Elizabeth's Hospi-
tal) owed appellant no duty to disclose his wife’s HIV-positive test results. On 
the contrary, the hospital staff owed a duty to appellant’s wife to refrain from 
disclosing that information to anyone, including her husband, without her 
written consent (or court order).” Id. at 499 (citing to D.C. Code § 6-117(b)(1) 
(1995)). See also Lemon, 682 A.2d at 1178, a case in which several of the pa-
tient’s family members and friends who had “personal contact with” the pa-
tient brought suit against patient’s physician for his failure to notify plaintiffs 
of patient’s HIV-positive status. The court held the physician did not owe pa-
tient’s family and friends a duty to inform them of patient’s HIV status. Id. at 
1184–85 (“There is no doubt that [the physician] had a duty, under common 
law and by statute, to inform [the patient] of his positive HIV status . . . . The 
issue is whether appellants can base their causes of action on the breach of a 
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cases. In these instances, courts have considered the im-
portance of privacy to outweigh the other interests—
presumably since those with HIV are less likely to act against 
third parties with malice as a result of their condition, and are 
not likely to place others in immediate fatal danger, as we will 
see in the next section. 
  STATE STATUTORY LAW AND DOCTORS’ DUTY TO 
REPORT IMPAIRED DRIVERS   
Many states have various laws requiring physicians to re-
port to the state people whose medical conditions might put 
others in danger, such as pilots, ship captains, or pedophiles.63 
For simplicity this section focuses on drivers, although similar 
considerations apply in the other cases as well. Indeed, most 
states have enacted laws requiring physicians to report indi-
viduals with certain serious medical conditions that will impair 
their driving to the state’s respective vehicle or motor depart-
ments.64 For example, California requires physicians to report 
only those medical conditions that are “characterized by lapses 
of consciousness.”65 Oregon requires physicians to report indi-
viduals whose “cognitive or functional impairment affects that 
person’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.”66 Nevada’s 
 
duty to [the patient]. We conclude that they cannot.”).  
 63. See Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists To 
Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 450–
51 (1991). 
 64. See Lee Black, Health Law: Physicians’ Legal Responsibility to Report 
Impaired Drivers, 10 VIRTUAL MENTOR 393, 393–94 (2008); see also Snyder & 
Bloom, supra note 42, at 77–78 (discussing some of these state laws). For ex-
amples of statutes concerning a physician’s duty to report drivers with certain 
impairing medical conditions, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103900 
(2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-112 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-311 
(2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.800 (2015); ORE. REV. STAT. § 807.710 (2013); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-303 (2015). The American Medical Association’s 
(AMA) Ethical and Judicial Affairs Council has also issued an opinion contain-
ing several recommendations for physicians and their duty to report patients 
with serious medical, driving-impairing conditions. Council on Ethical and Ju-
dicial Affairs, Opinion 2.24: Impaired Drivers and Their Physicians, AM. MED. 
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/ 
code-medical-ethics/opinion224.page? (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). The opinion 
states that “[p]hysicians should assess patients’ physical or mental impair-
ments that might adversely affect driving abilities” and that “[t]he purpose of 
[the] report is to articulate physicians’ responsibility to recognize impairments 
in patients’ driving ability that pose a strong threat to public safety and which 
ultimately may need to be reported to the Department of Motor Vehicles.” Id. 
 65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103900(a) (2015). 
 66. ORE. REV. STAT. § 807.710(2)(a) (2013). 
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statute provides that “hospitals, medical clinics, and similar in-
stitutions which treat persons who are blind, night-blind or 
whose vision is severely impaired” must report such persons to 
the state.67 Both Montana and Minnesota’s statutes, on the oth-
er hand, are more flexible and make reporting discretionary. 
For example, the Montana statute states that a “physician who 
diagnoses a physical or mental condition that, in the physi-
cian’s judgment, will significantly impair a person’s ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle may voluntarily report” such an 
individual.68 
The situation bares the characteristics of a social dilemma 
in the sense that there is a conflict between the interests of an 
individual and the interests of the group to which the individu-
al belongs. Society may prefer that people with medical prob-
lems that negatively affect road safety not drive, because they 
may endanger themselves or others. The main concern, howev-
er, is the chilling effect: drivers who are worried that they may 
have a medical problem that will cause them to lose their driv-
er’s license may choose not to report that problem to their phy-
sician. Consequently, the medical problem will remain untreat-
ed, possibly leading to even greater safety problems, including 
increased morbidity and mortality. Of course, whether the 
chilling effect is substantial is an empirical question, which the 
next section discusses. 
  SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CHILLING EFFECTS   
Evidence suggests that people may fail to report a medical 
problem if they believe that reporting the problem will result in 
negative consequences for them. For instance, there is ample 
evidence that pilots who have to fill out a medical report to re-
new their pilot license hide information about their medical 
problems. In an early study, postmortem toxicology analyses of 
general aviation pilots showed forty-eight cases with possibly 
incapacitating conditions: thirteen cardiovascular (three re-
ported), seven neurological (none reported), twenty-eight psy-
chiatric (none reported).69 More recently, in a sample of 40,000 
 
 67. NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.800 (2015). 
 68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-311(1) (2015) (emphasis added); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 171.131 (2015).  
 69. OFFICE OF AVIATION MED., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., REPORT NO. 
DOT/FAA/AM-94/14, UNREPORTED MEDICATIONS USED IN INCAPACITATING 
MEDICAL CONDITIONS FOUND IN FATAL CIVIL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 2 (1994), 
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/1
990s/media/AM94-14.pdf.  
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airmen certificate-holders, the Inspector General found more 
than 3,200 airmen holding current medical certificates while 
simultaneously receiving Social Security benefits, including 
those for medically disabling conditions.70 
Fear of losing one’s driving license is another concern 
which may lead people to refrain from seeking therapy.71 The 
problem also extends to commercial drivers who rely on their 
licenses for their careers and thus have an added incentive to 
refrain from reporting conditions. Data from a study of drivers 
suffering from sleep apnea led the lead researchers to hypothe-
size that commercial drivers may be less likely to report their 
sleepiness in order to protect their job.72 A similar problem ex-
ists in mental health. Data show that about twenty-five percent 
of psychotherapy clients drop out after a report is made, with-
out accounting for those who psychologically drop out and close 
down (this figure came from agency psychotherapy and does 
not account for private practice).73 Those who do remain in 
treatment after a report is made often become guarded and lose 
trust in their therapist, requiring several weeks or more to re-
pair the fragile relationship.74 
The chilling effect of mandatory reporting laws has been 
specifically noted in research related to child abuse. For exam-
ple, on July 1, 1988, Maryland’s amendment to a statute re-
quiring reporting of child sexual abuse disclosed by adult pa-
tients seeking treatment became effective.75 The rate of 
disclosure at a particular Maryland clinic between January 1, 
1984 and July 1, 1988, when there was no duty to report re-
 
 70. Falsification of FAA Airman Medical Certificate Applications by Disa-
bility Recipients: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on 
Transp. and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Calvin L. 
Scovel, III, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation), https:// 
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/SAFE_PILOT_Testimony_july17.pdf.  
 71. See Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Diabetes and Driving, 35 DIABETES CARE 
S81, S84 (2012) (noting reluctance to seek treatment due to fear of losing one’s 
license in the context of mandated physician reporting); M.C. Salinsky et al., 
Epilepsy, Driving Laws, and Patient Disclosure to Physicians, 33 EPILEPSIA 
469, 470 (1992) (finding that patients with epilepsy may not report seizures for 
fear of losing their license to drive). 
 72. See Commercial Drivers Could Be Understating Sleep Apnea 
Symptoms for Fear of Losing Their License, SCI. DAILY (Aug. 26, 2012), http:// 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/08/120826143352.htm. 
 73. Murray Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated 
Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 711, 730 (1993). 
 74. See id. at 732–33. 
 75. Berlin et al., supra note 63, at 450. 
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lapses during treatment, was around two per month.76 Between 
July 1, 1988 and the end of 1990 (when the research was ac-
cepted for publication), the rate of these disclosures dropped to 
zero, while the rate of disclosures for offenses that did not re-
quire reporting (not involving children) did not drop off during 
that same period.77 This suggests that potentially abused chil-
dren went unidentified because offenders did not want to dis-
close their behavior and risk being reported. In addition, the 
clinic showed that seventy-three self-referred patients who had 
previous sexual activity with children entered treatment be-
tween January 1, 1979 and July 1, 1989.78 This rate of about 
one patient seeking treatment every two months dropped to ze-
ro during the following year, suggesting that individuals who 
would have sought help prior to the enactment of the law no 
longer sought to remedy their pedophilia for fear of being re-
ported. 
  THE OPTIMAL DUTY TO WARN AND REPORT   
Courts and commentators have mainly taken into account 
the foreseeability of the risk of the patient to third parties as 
the most relevant factor to consider when establishing a duty to 
report or warn.79 Courts and commentators have occasionally 
also considered the chilling effect that imposing such a duty 
will have on patients’ willingness to seek therapy. Still, the op-
timal scope of the duty to warn is quite different. In order to 
achieve optimal incentives for both doctors (in treating patients 
effectively) and patients (in obtaining health and mental care 
treatment), the likelihood of success in treatment and its im-
pact on the primary behavior of concern should be weighed 
against the negative deterrent effect such a duty would have on 
patients’ motivations to seek help and its implications for the 
primary behavior of concern. Thus, for example, if the potential 
treatment for certain conditions is very effective, and as a re-
 
 76. Id. at 451. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 451–52. 
 79. Describing the doctrine as imposing a duty solely through foreseeabil-
ity is inaccurate. Courts also check that a care provider assumes control over a 
potentially dangerous patient. In Tarasoff the California court used a broad 
version of the “control doctrine.” In New York, the “control doctrine” is nar-
rower than in California. Under New York law, control must be physical ra-
ther than psychological, and so a psychiatrist who can commit his patient will 
have a duty to report, but a psychologist as in Tarasoff will not. See Rivera v. 
N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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sult the expected social costs associated with the primary be-
havior of concern are significantly reduced, the duty placed on 
doctors to report and warn should be relaxed so as to not deter 
individuals with such treatable conditions from seeking health 
care, even if the patients still remain very dangerous after the 
treatment.  
The next section presents a simple model that captures the 
dilemma. The issue can be modeled in a number of ways. One 
way is to develop a game-theoretical model that provides the 
equilibrium calculations for decision makers who have to decide 
whether to seek medical treatment for their condition, consider-
ing that they may lose their driver’s license if their physician 
reports them. Such a model needs to specify the utilities of var-
ious factors, such as the benefits derived from continued driv-
ing and the treatment for the medical problem. These, in turn, 
depend on numerous factors, including the availability of alter-
natives to driving (public transportation, a spouse with a li-
cense, etc.), the need for a car to access services (inner city res-
idents will need a car less than people living in rural areas), the 
medical status of the individual, and other factors. Alternative-
ly one can develop a simple decision analytic model that speci-
fies the minimal conditions in which a policy that requires phy-
sicians to report medical problems can be beneficial. We 
adopted this latter approach.  
In our model we only deal with the probabilities for acci-
dent involvement with and without medical treatment for a 
medical problem, and with and without the enforcement of the 
duty to report. We focus on patients’ decision to seek care as a 
function of the duty to report or warn. We hold constant other 
possible factors that might influence patients’ decisions. For 
example, we ignore the effectiveness of the treatment for reduc-
ing accident involvement on patients’ decisions to seek care. Al-
so, patients are likely to seek care for many reasons, such as to 
reduce symptoms, to receive disability benefits, and not neces-
sarily to improve their driving. We also do not deal with any is-
sues that might affect people’s tendency to report a medical is-
sue, such as privacy concerns. The model instead focuses on the 
population and does not address physicians’ decisions. For ex-
ample, physicians might “diagnose” patients as suffering from 
something other than epilepsy to avoid having to report their 
patients (either because they want to save the personal incon-
venience involved or to protect their patients from losing their 
driving license). Our model, in contrast, focuses on the impact 
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of care seeking on accident likelihood. We focus primarily on 
the impact of the legal duty to report or warn, which is why 
this is the only moving part in our model.  
Thus, we provide an answer to the following question: giv-
en the effectiveness of a treatment in reducing accidents among 
people with a medical problem, what is the maximal chilling ef-
fect, after the duty to report is imposed, up to which the law 
has a positive effect (in terms of reduced probability for a car 
accidents)? If, for instance, a duty to warn third parties or re-
port patients will only have a positive effect if more than ninety 
percent of the affected people seek medical treatment, one may 
want to consider the implementation of the duty with caution. 
The reason is that the chilling effect stemming from imposing 
the duty might deter patients from reporting their medical con-
ditions, and as a result the ninety percent threshold will never 
be met. Alternatively, if imposing a duty has a beneficial effect 
even where only a relatively small percentage of the affected 
population seeks medical treatment, the law can more easily be 
justified, as even a large chilling effect will not offset the bene-
fits of imposing the duty. 
We first model the physician’s scope of duty to report pa-
tients’ dangerous driving to the state. Later, we will discuss the 
implications for the duty to warn in tort law.  
A. THE MODEL  
Some notations and definitions: 
pA – Probability of accident involvement in the population 
pM – Probability of a particular medical problem in the 
population 
pDrive – Probability that a person with the medical problem 
will drive (depends on self-regulation) 
pDiagnose – Probability of a physician correctly diagnosing the 
medical problem (depends on uniqueness of symptoms, etc.) 
pC – Probability that a patient will complain about a par-
ticular problem 
pCne – probability of a patient complaining when the duty to 
report is not enforced 
pCe – probability of a patient complaining when the duty to 
report is enforced 
pN – Probability that a patient will continue to drive not-
withstanding license revocation (in the no-enforcement regime 
we assume all patients drive) 
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Kt – Increase in accident probability when a person has the 
disease and receives treatment pA|t= pAKt where 1 ≤ Kt 
Knt – Increase in accident probability when a person has 
the disease and does not receive treatment  
pA|nt = pAKnt where Kt ≤ Knt and pAKnt ≤ 1 
 
Figure 1: The Model for a Situation without a Duty to Report 
According to this model the probability for an accident will 
be: 
pNoDuty=(1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCne)pAKnt  
                                                                                    +pCne(pDiagnosepAKt + 
(1–pDiagnose)pAKnt)) 
When the duty to report is enforced two parts of the equa-
tion change: 
1. Instead of pCne (the probability of a patient complaining 
when the duty is not enforced) the probability is now pCe (the 
probability of a patient complaining when the duty is enforced), 
with the latter being smaller or equal to the former. 
2. The probability of those drivers who complained and 
were diagnosed as having the medical problem is now pN, which 
is the probability that they drive although they were diagnosed 
with a disqualifying condition. This could be because the physi-
cian does not report them, or they decide to drive even though 
their licenses were cancelled.80 
 
 80. If we assume that all drivers who will have their drivers’ license re-
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After these changes the revised model now becomes: 
pDuty = (1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCe)pAKnt 
                                                                                     +pCe(pDiagnosepA*pN + 
 (1–pDiagnose)pAKnt)) 
 
Equating the two expressions gives: 
(1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCne)pAKnt+pCne(pDiagnosepAKt + (1–pDiagnose)pAKnt))= 
(1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCe)pAKnt+pCe(pDiagnosepApNKt + (1–pDiagnose)pAKnt)) 
 
 
Expanding the expressions and eliminating all joint parts on 
both sides: 






The minimal probability of people seeking medical atten-
tion even when the duty is enforced for the law to have a posi-





The expression can be somewhat simplified. For one, we can 
assume that any legislation will only be meaningful if pCne is 
relatively close to 1. If this probability is low, then most people 
with the medical problem will not be seen by a physician, and 
the duty to report will have little meaning. Also, we can assume 
that pN will be close to 0, i.e., most people who lose their driv-
er’s licenses will cease to drive, considering that driving after a 
license was revoked is a misdemeanor in many states and may 
lead to fines or jail sentences of various lengths, depending on 
the state.81 Assuming pCne = 1 (without the duty to report pa-
 
voked will indeed stop driving, then it becomes 0; no accidents will occur. Also, 
the model ignores possible accident involvement as pedestrians. 
 81. See Driving While Revoked, Suspended or Otherwise Unlicensed: Pen-
alties by State, NAT. CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/driving-while-revoked-suspended-
or-otherwise-unli.aspx. 
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tients to the state, all patients will complain about their dis-
ease) and pN = 0 (all patients whose driver’s license was re-






The maximal chilling effect (i.e. the maximal proportion of 
people who may fail to report a medical problem in order for the 
duty to report to have a positive effect) is 1–pCe. It is possible to 
analyze several different cases: 
1. Knt = Kt: Assuming that the treatment is not effective in 
preventing accidents, that is, that the increase in acci-
dent probability when a person has the disease and re-
ceives treatment is identical to the increase when it 
does not, Knt = Kt, then the right-hand side becomes ze-
ro, and no matter how big the chilling effect is (how 
small pCe is), it is always efficient to impose a duty.  
2. Kt =1: Assuming that the treatment is so effective that 
with treatment the disease has no impact on the proba-
bility of accidents, then the right-hand side becomes 
closer to 1 the larger Knt is. Thus, the larger Knt is, the 
more inefficient it is to impose the duty, even if the 
chilling effect is small. 
3. 1 < Kt < Knt: Here the answer depends on the values of Kt 
and Knt. Assuming that the increase in accident proba-
bility when a person has the disease and does not re-
ceive treatment is fourfold, Knt = 4, and the increase 
when she does receive treatment is twofold, Kt = 2, then 
at least half [(4-2)/4=.5] of the people with the medical 
problem have to complain about their problem for en-
forcing the duty to report to have the benefit it purport-
ed to achieve: reduction in the probability of accidents. 
In other words, the chilling effect should not be too 
large for the duty to be efficient.  
Figure 2 depicts the maximal chilling effect of patients 
complaining about the medical problem for the duty to report to 
be efficient, assuming Kt = 2 and 4.  
Avraham & Meyer_2fmt  































Figure 2: Maximal chilling effect (proportion of people failing to 
report a medical problem) when the duty to report is enforced 
as a function of the increase of accident likelihood when the 
problem is not treated (Knt) for problems that, when treated, in-
crease the accident likelihood two or four times (Kt). 
B. APPLYING THE MODEL TO TORT LAW’S DUTY TO WARN 
When applying the model to torts, one can easily see that, 
from a social welfare perspective, whether a doctor should be 
liable to third parties (the victims of his patient) for not report-
ing the patients’ condition should be negatively correlated with 
the probability that—as a result of imposing the duty on the 
doctor—the patient will refrain from receiving treatment. Thus, 
the availability of effective treatment and its impact on the 
primary behavior of concern, (together with the chilling effect,) 
should determine whether a duty should be enforced—not the 
severity of the medical problem or the dangerousness it implies 
alone. If dementia is not treatable, while epilepsy is, there is a 
case on efficiency grounds for imposing a duty to warn identi-
fied potential victims of patients with dementia, but to lift it for 
potential victims of epileptic patients, if all else (specifically the 
chilling effect) is equal.  
But what if the victims are not identified? Recall that the 
courts in Lipari (shooting in the night club) and Duvall (driving 
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with epilepsy) imposed a duty towards unidentifiable victims. 
On its face, the dilemma and the solution are the same. The on-
ly new component here is that the costs and effectiveness of 
warning should also be part of the calculation. Because warn-
ing identified victims (like in Tarasoff) is relatively cheap, and 
can prevent the harm at relatively low costs, it makes more 
sense (holding all else equal) to impose a duty in cases like 
Tarasoff than to do so in cases like Lipari or Duvall. For that 
reason, it makes sense that physicians will satisfy their duty 
towards unidentified victims in torts if they warn the relevant 
authorities, even if they do not warn the actual victims.  
Duvall and Lipari can, however, be distinguished. In Du-
vall the court found that the doctor was negligent towards his 
own patient (for not warning him to not drive) and the question 
was whether liability towards the patient should be extended 
towards the patient’s car accident victims. In contrast, in Lipa-
ri the duty found was directly towards the shooter’s victims and 
not through the patient. Because warning patients not to drive 
does not raise problems of chilling effects, there are better rea-
sons to find the doctor liable to his patient’s victims in these 
cases. For this reason, it is easier to justify Duvall than Lipari. 
The same analysis helps explain Reisner, where the court found 
for the plaintiff after the doctor did not warn his patient (the 
plaintiff’s girlfriend) that she had AIDS.82  
In contrast, when the doctor does warn his patient about 
his dangerousness and the treatment is effective, our model 
suggests that physicians might not have a duty to warn even 
identified third parties. Indeed, as far as we know, there are no 
cases where a court has imposed liability on a physician for 
failing to warn a third party whom the physician knows may 
have been exposed to HIV by his patient if the patient himself 
has already been notified.  
Lastly, our model implies that in cases where the policy 
maker does not have good data on the effectiveness of treat-
ment with respect to the primary behavior of interest, such as 
in cases of psychotherapy, the providers should be left with dis-
cretion on whether or not to report his patients. The reason is 
 
 82. In Reisner the victim was identifiable, which makes the case for find-
ing against the doctor even stronger. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995).  
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simple: the provider is in the best position to weigh both the 
costs and the benefits of reporting or warning. Accordingly, 
mental health professionals should be immune from liability for 
negligence, although perhaps not from gross negligence, both 
when they warn and when they do not warn the authorities or 
third parties. Tarasoff therefore was wrongly decided. 
C. APPLYING THE MODEL TO REPORTING STATUTES 
Similarly, in the context of state reporting statutes, wheth-
er there should be a duty to report (or whether the statute 
should be enforced) depends on the context. It might well be 
more justifiable to impose a duty to report patients with non-
treatable conditions than patients with treatable conditions, so 
that those with treatable conditions will not be deterred from 
seeking medical help. Methodological difficulties, as well as 
ethical concerns, make the study of the efficacy of treatment for 
medical conditions particularly difficult.83 Indeed, empirical ev-
idence is not always available, and may be controversial. Yet, 
some clear examples for the effectiveness of medical treatment 
on the primary behavior of concern still exist.84  
For example, in 2008 Hovinga et al. computed the efficacy 
of epilepsy treatment at reducing the risk of motor vehicle acci-
dents amongst those suffering from the disease.85 The study 
featured 408 individuals diagnosed with epilepsy and pre-
scribed anti-epileptic medication and classified each participant 
as either adherent patients (n=298) or non-adherent (n=110) 
(those who self-reported missing a dose or stopping their medi-
cation in the prior month).86 The study found that after control-
ling for confounding variables, the non-adherent participants 
had a statistically significant increased chance (OR: 1.92, 
p=0.03, CI: 1.07–3.43) of experiencing a motor vehicle accident 
due to a seizure.87 
 
 83. See JUDITH CHARLTON ET AL., INFLUENCE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS ON 
CRASH INVOLVEMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVERS 548 (2d ed. 2010), http:// 
www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/216386/muarc300.pdf. 
 84. See id. for studies focusing on the efficacy of medical treatment. 
 85. See Collin A. Hovinga et al., Association of Non-Adherence to Antiepi-
leptic Drugs and Seizures, Quality of Life, and Productivity: Survey of Patients 
with Epilepsy and Physicians, 13 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 316 (2008).  
 86. Id. at 319. 
 87. Id. at 319–20. 
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Similarly, treatment of sleep apnea through continuous 
positive airway pressure (CPAP) has also been shown to result 
in a statistically significant decrease in the risk of automobile 
accidents. Findley et al. found that a group of fifty participants 
with sleep apnea had on average .07 crashes per person in the 
two years prior to CPAP treatment, a number which dropped to 
zero for those who underwent treatment, but remained un-
changed for those who did not.88 George found similar results 
when analyzing driving records of a control group and 210 par-
ticipants who underwent treatment for sleep apnea.89 George 
noted that for the three years prior to CPAP treatment, partici-
pants with sleep apnea had a significantly higher crash rate 
than the control group.90 The 182 that underwent continuous 
treatment subsequently saw their crash rate fall to the same 
level as the control group, whereas the twenty-seven who were 
not current CPAP users at the time of the follow-up continued 
to have a high crash rate relative to the control group.91 
The effectiveness of current cataract treatment at reducing 
crash risk for drivers suffering from the condition was also evi-
dent in a recent study by Owsley et al.92 The study compared 
174 older drivers who had undergone cataract surgery to 103 
older drivers suffering from cataracts who had not received 
treatment.93 After adjusting for confounding variables, the 
crash risk ratio was 0.47, indicating an almost 50% reduction 
after surgery.94 Furthermore, the non-surgery group experi-
enced a statistically significant increase in crash prevalence 
during the follow-up period, compared to the five years prior to 
the study, whereas the treatment group exhibited a modest, 
non-significant increase.95 
 
 88. Larry Findley et al., Treatment with Nasal CPAP Decreases Automo-
bile Accidents in Patients with Sleep Apnea, 161 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITI-
CAL CARE MED., 857, 858 (2000).  
 89. C.F.P. George, Reduction in Motor Vehicle Collisions Following 
Treatment of Sleep Apnoea with Nasal CPAP, 56 THORAX 508, 510 (2001). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Cynthia Owsley et al., Impact of Cataract Surgery on Motor Vehi-
cle Crash Involvement of Older Adults, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 841 (2002).  
 93. Id. at 844. 
 94. Id. at 845. 
 95. Id. 
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The efficacy of treatment for the aforementioned conditions 
suggests provisionally that a duty to report imposed on physi-
cians should be relaxed for these conditions. In contrast, there 
are medical conditions for which treatment has not been shown 
to improve patients’ crash risk. In fact, some studies indicated 
that treatment may even exacerbate them.  
A prime example of this is the case of psychiatric illnesses. 
Typically these are treated with prescription medication. While 
methodological issues make it difficult to discern whether ele-
vated crash risk is associated with the condition itself or the 
prescribed medication, certain drugs used in the treatment of 
these conditions have been shown to impair driving ability. In 
the case of depression, research has indicated that cyclic anti-
depressants are associated with a greater risk of injurious 
crash involvement,97 and that depressed patients receiving 
long-term antidepressant treatment (SSRIs) suffer significant 
impairment in their driving abilities as compared to healthy 
individuals.98 Benzodiazepines are the most commonly pre-
scribed medication for anxiety disorders and insomnia99 and 
have been shown to impair vision, attention, and motor skills, 
among other qualities.100 Studies have shown that benzodiaze-
pine use generally correlates to increased crash risk, at-fault 
crash risk,101 and a reduction in overall driving capabilities.102 
The prevalence of benzodiazepine and antidepressant prescrip-
tions and their acknowledged driving-impairing side effects 
means that individuals suffering from psychiatric illnesses 
treated with these drugs potentially pose a crash risk and thus, 
under the model presented in this paper, should potentially be 
reported, or treated in other ways. 
 
 97. Wayne A. Ray et al., Psychoactive Drugs and the Risk of Injurious Mo-
tor Vehicle Crashes in Elderly Drivers, 136 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 873, 877 
(1992).  
 98. Marleen Wingen et al., Driving Impairment in Depressed Patients Re-
ceiving Long-Term Antidepressant Treatment, 188 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 84, 
87 (2006).  
 99. See Wayne A. Ray et al., Medications and the Older Driver. 9 CLINICS 
GERIATRIC MED. 413, 417 (1993). 
 100. Id. at 421–22. 
 101. See F. Barbone et al., Association of Road-Traffic Accidents with Ben-
zodiazepine Use, 352 LANCET 1331, 1334 (1998).  
 102. James F. O’Hanlon et al., Anxiolytics’ Effects on the Actual Driving 
Performance of Patients and Healthy Volunteers in a Standardized Test, 31 
NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 81, 85–87 (1995). 
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Diabetes is another example of a condition for which re-
search has not shown a conclusive lowering of the risk of traffic 
accidents following treatment for individuals suffering from the 
disease.103 In fact, there is some evidence that diabetes patients 
treated with insulin may actually have a higher crash risk than 
those with untreated diabetes.104 Lave et al. determined that 
the crash risk for Insulin Dependent Diabetics is 6.1 times 
greater than the relative crash risk for Non-Insulin Dependent 
Diabetics.105 Despite this finding, the jury on the efficacy of 
treatment for diabetes and its resulting effects on crash risk it 
still out. Charlton et al., after assessing multiple studies on di-
abetes and crash risk, determined that the available data is in-
conclusive.106 However, if Lave et al.’s findings are accurate and 
diabetics undergoing insulin therapy are a greater crash risk 
than diabetics not on insulin therapy, then under the model 
proposed in this paper diabetes should be considered a condi-
tion which needs to be reported. 
In sum, our model implies that the optimal duty to protect 
patients’ privacy depends on empirical data. A 2010 572-page 
report by Charlton et al. compiles data from numerous studies 
separated by relevant condition or illness, where each has a 
section devoted to summarizing research related to the effect of 
treatment on crash risk. Our model implies that such data is 
relevant for physicians, courts, and policy makers in their de-
terminations regarding the optimal scope of a physician’s duty.  
Lastly, our model implies that when the dangerousness of 
the primary behavior, Knt, is very high, then the optimal solu-
tion might be to enact statutes that effectively increase the 
likelihood that patients’ medical condition is discovered (i.e., to 
increase pC). In such cases mandatory checkups (e.g. for pilots) 
might be warranted. If the treatment is effective, mandatory 
“checkup” laws will increase safety by curing more patients. If 
the treatment is not effective, mandatory checkup laws will in-
 
 103. See CHARLTON ET AL., supra note 83, at 549. 
 104. See Larry A. Distiller & Brian D. Kramer, Driving and Diabetics on 
Insulin Therapy, 86 SOUTH AFR. MED. J. 1018, 1019 (1996).  
 105. Lester B. Lave et al., Should Persons with Diabetes Be Licensed to 
Drive Trucks?—Risk Management, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 327, 330–31 (1993).  
 106. See CHARLTON ET AL., supra note 83, at 549. 
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crease safety by removing dangerous actors from the public 
sphere. Indeed, many states have exactly such laws.107  
  CONCLUSION   
Many who knew Andreas Lubitz were shocked to hear that 
the quiet, polite, and friendly young pilot was responsible for 
the death of 150 innocent people.108 As individuals, his friends, 
co-workers, and family were understandably limited in their 
ability to identify red flags and stop Lubitz before he deliber-
ately crashed Flight 9525. As a society, we certainly have the 
tools to prevent another Germanwings-type disaster. However, 
any potential solution we engage must concede to the im-
portance of protecting patients’ privacy and related interests, 
namely, personal autonomy, individuality, respect, and human 
dignity or worth.109  
When discussing the optimal scope of the duty to protect 
patients’ privacy, the literature compares two incommensura-
ble interests: privacy and safety. The approach we take in this 
paper solves the incommensurability problem. We treat privacy 
as important because it is instrumental for effective therapy, 
which in turn reduces patients’ risk to society. Thus, we devel-
op a model which finds the optimal balance between protecting 
patient privacy (as a means to reduce risk in society) and warn-
ing third parties or the state (again as means to reduce risk in 
society).  
Our model shows that imposing an unqualified duty to re-
port and warn might result in an increase in the dangerousness 
of the primary behavior society is concerned about, such as pi-
loting, driving, or violent acts. Thus, the chilling effect and the 
 
 107. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE 16:64-7.4 (2015) (requiring maritime pilots 
to undergo medical examinations at least annually to check for general health, 
vision and hearing); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 363-116-120 (2015) (requiring an 
annual general physical examination). 
 108. Monica Houston-Waesch & Natascha Divac, Mystery Surrounds Pos-
sible Motive for Germanwings Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz, WALL ST. J., http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/germanwings-co-pilot-named-as-andreas-lubitz-1427370 
009 (last updated Mar. 26, 2015).  
 109. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An 
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000 (1964); Ruth Gavison, 
Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 438, 455 (1980); Robert 
C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001); Alan F. 
Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970’s, 66 
COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1022 (1966). 
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effectiveness of the medical treatment must be factors that 
courts should consider in imposing a duty on medical profes-
sionals to warn third parties or a duty to report their patients 
to the state. Interestingly, treatment need not eliminate the 
risk, nor need it lower the patient’s accident risk to that of a 
person without a medical condition. The formula presented 
above represents the trade-off at the margin between the bene-
fits of not having a duty (curing the patient and improving his 
driving, or assisting patients with violent tendencies) and the 
costs of having a duty (patients refraining from going to doctors 
and continuing to drive or fly, or patients refraining from seek-
ing mental health care and becoming a danger to themselves 
and society). 
Thus, holding all else equal, the more effective the treat-
ment for a medical or mental health condition is at reducing 
the danger of the primary behavior, the less society should be 
willing to impose a duty to report or warn. While the driving or 
flying ability of an individual with a serious medical condition 
may be significantly worse than that of an individual with no 
such medical condition, if the former’s driving or piloting ability 
with treatment is significantly better than without treatment, 
requiring physicians to report such patients might have an ad-
verse effect. Lastly, whenever it is not clear in advance whether 
a specific treatment is effective, such as with psychotherapy, 
providers should be left with discretion whether to warn third 
parties or report to the state and immune from liability for neg-
ligence, although perhaps not from gross negligence.  
The decision not to impose a duty to report or warn does not 
imply that society should not encourage people to report their 
medical problems. Rather, other policy measures, besides en-
forcing the duty to report or warn, can be used, such as provid-
ing people with benefits when reporting, creating social pres-
sure to report, and lowering the negative consequences from 
reporting the problem (e.g., in the case of driving, by providing 
alternative transportation solutions). These steps are likely to 
have desired effects without the negative consequences that 
may arise from enforcing the duty to report or warn.  
 
